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MULTIPLE VICTIMIZATION: EVIDENCE,
THEORY, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
RICHARD F. SPARKS*
INTRODUCTION
Without exception, victimization surveys over the past fifteen years
have found that the great majority of the surveyed population report
that none of the incidents they were asked about had happened to them
during the period covered; a minority report that they experienced one
incident; and successively smaller proportions generally report having
experienced two, three . . . n incidents. This last group has been re-
ferred to, rather misleadingly,1 as "multiple victims;" it is this group,
and their experiences, with which this article is concerned.
The phenomenon of multiple victimization raises a number of
problems. Some of these problems are methodological; in particular,
multiple victims pose a host of problems for those interested in victimi-
zation surveys, especially those surveys, such as the National Crime
Surveys now being carried out by the United States Census Bureau for
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which aim to measure
the volume of certain crimes or victimization in the general population.
Multiple victims also raise some important substantive issues. Why do
some people become victims of crime whereas others do not? To what
extent can people act in ways that minimize, if not eliminate, the risk of
future victimization? What are the social, psychic, and economic costs
of being the victim of a crime? The answers to these questions may be
no different in the case of multiple victims than for those victimized only
once; but even if that is so, those answers may be easier to see if we look
at multiple or recurrent victimization rather than occasional, sporadic,
or egregious events.
This article will review briefly the available evidence on multiple
* Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University; Ph.D., Cambridge Univer-
sity.
I It is misleading because the expression "multiple victimization" is also used to refer to
(a) cases in which there is more than one victim in a single incident, and (b) cases in which a
single victim suffers more than one crime at one time, such as when a person is raped, robbed,
and has her car stolen. I neglect both of these complications in this article.
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victimization, and will sketch a theoretical framework within which it
might be studied as part of a broader effort aimed at explaining the
observed distribution of criminal victimization. Some promising direc-
tions for future empirical research on multiple victims will then be indi-
cated.
THE EVIDENCE ON MULTIPLE VICTIMIZATION
Having ascertained the existence of multiple reported victimization
in surveyed populations, the next step is to ask whether it is more than a
random phenomenon. This has usually been done by comparing ob-
served (survey-reported) distributions of incidents (k = 0, 1, 2 . . . K)
with the distributions that would be expected if victimization were a
Poisson process characterized by a transition rate that is constant over
the entire surveyed population. In practice, of course, it is estimated
from the sample mean rate. Almost invariably, the observed and ex-
pected distributions do differ to a statistically significant extent: ob-
served distributions contain more nonvictims, and more multiple
victims, than the Poisson process predicts.2
The hypothesis that criminal victimizations "cluster" in the popu-
lation may reasonably be rejected for the same reason that flying bombs
clustered in particular blocks in London, or that chromosome in-
terchanges occur with certain frequencies after organic cells are irradi-
ated by x-rays, ie., chance.3 Unfortunately, that rejection would be
more interesting if there had ever been any reason to accept the hypoth-
esis in the first place. As Coleman4 has pointed out, the importance of
the Poisson process in relation to social phenomena does not lie in its
empirical fit to social data, but rather in the assumptions on which the
distribution is based, and in the fact that these may be reasonable as-
sumptions about the process underlying the phenomena. To say that
2 For evidence on this point, see, e.g., K. AROMAA, ARKIPAIVAN VAKIVALTAA SUOMESSA
(Everyday Violence in Finland) (1971); A. BIDERMAN, REPORT ON A PILOT SURVEY IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ON VICTIMIZATION AND ATTITUDES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
(1967); M. HINDELANG, M. GOTTFREDSON & J. GAROFALO, VICTIMS OF PERSONAL CRIME:
AN EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION FOR A THEORY OF PERSONAL VICTIMIZATION (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PERSONAL CRIME]; A. REISS, JR., STUDIES IN CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS (1967); P. REYNOLDS, VICTIMIZATION IN A METROPOLI-
TAN RE ION: COMPARISON OF A CENTRAL CITY AREA AND A SUBURBAN REGION (1973); R.
SPARKS, H. GENN & D. DODD, SURVEYING VICTIMS: A STUDY OF THE MEASUREMENT OF
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND ATTITUDES TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE
88 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PERCEPTIONS]; P. WOLF, VOLD I DANMARK I FINLAND,
1970/71 EN SAMMENLIGNING AF VOLDSOFRE (1972); Aromaa, Victimization to Violence: A Gal-
lup Sur'q, 2 INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 333 (1973).
3 See 1 W. FELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICA-
TIONS 159 (1950).
4 J. COLEMAN, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 291 (1964).
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the Poisson distribution does not fit the observed distribution of victimi-
zation is to say that one or more of those assumptions is not valid, e.g.,
that events are not independent or that the process is not governed by a
transition rate which is the same for each member of the population.
Before turning to these possibilities, we ought to note some limita-
tions of the research on this subject to date. First, the deviation from
expectation under a Poisson process-too many nonvictims, and too
many multiple victims-may be the result of response bias. The data,
after all, concern the numbers of incidents mentioned to interviewers,
which almost certainly are not the same as the numbers of incidents
actually occurring. Most victimization surveys-in particular, the Na-
tional Crime Surveys-probably severely understate the victimization
experience of those surveyed. The observed frequency distribution may
be due in part to the fact that some respondents are more productive
than others when asked about things which may have happened to them
in the past six months or year. It is doubtful, however, that this can
explain the whole of the deviation from chance expectation. Conceiva-
bly, it may mask the extent of that deviation. The key question is
whether incidents not now being reported to survey interviewers have
happened to persons reporting at least one other incident, or whether
they are mostly incidents which happened to persons reporting no inci-
dents at all. For the moment, there is little evidence on this one way or
the other.5 In either case, underreporting to interviewers could hardly
be the entire explanation.
A second limitation of the research on this subject concerns so-
called series victimizations, ie., those cases in which a respondent says
that several things happened to him in a certain time period, but that he
cannot remember precise numbers or details of those incidents.6 By def-
inition, such a series victim is a multiple victim, but arguably series inci-
dents should be excluded, or counted as one victimization, especially
where such incidents are necessarily measured with great imprecision.
In fact, whether such cases are included or excluded from the observed
distribution of victimization apparently makes little difference to the ba-
sic conclusion. 7
A third limitation of the studies cited above is that they all involved
cross-sectional data derived from a single interview in which the respon-
5 See PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 95-97.
6 In the National Crime Survey, series victimizations are defined as three or more similar
incidents that occur to the respondent during the reference period, for which the respondent
cannot recall details of the individual events. The season of occurrence is asked; an estimate
of the total number of incidents in the series is made; and details are obtained where possible
on the last of the incidents. The similarity of the incidents is established because they are
mentioned in response to a particular screen question.
7 Cf, e.g., PERSONAL CRIME, supra note 2.
[Vol. 72
VICTIMOLOGY SYMPOSIUM
dent was asked about a time period, usually one year preceding the in-
terview. For a variety of reasons, it is not easy in practice to partition
that time period in analyzing survey data. It is often difficult to be sure
that reported events are dated or ordered accurately. The restriction to
cross-sectional data makes it impossible to distinguish between two com-
peting explanations for multiple victimization as a continuing phenome-
non, enduring over some substantial time period, in the victim's life.
Reiss is currently analyzing one longitudinal data set consisting of re-
sponses from successive interviews with respondents in the national
household panel component of the National Crime Surveys. But the
difficulties posed by this data set are considerable.8
Unfortunately, when we move from cross-sectional survey data to
consider a number of time periods, whether these be survey reference
periods, or arbitrary intervals of time such as one calendar year, it is not
very clear what a multiple victim is. Consider, for example, the seven
six-month periods on which a respondent in the NCS surveys may re-
port. Suppose he is assaulted in time period t,, assaulted (or something)
again in t 2 , again in t5 , and then three times in t 6 ? Suppose that a house
or store is broken into in t, and then again in t 7 ? What if a respondent
experiences a series of assaults in t 2 , another series in t 4 , and then single
discrete assaults in t 6 and t7? Is someone a multiple victim if his house
was broken into in 1956, and again in 1980? If they suffer any kind of
criminal victimization over their lifetime? Plainly the answer to the last
question must be no; otherwise one could never cease to be a multiple
victim once having attained that status. There is nothing to be gained
by treating "multiple victimization" as an absorbing state. I shall sug-
gest below a way in which this question may be tackled. That it re-
mains a question illustrates the work still to be done on the problem of
multiple victimization.
Multiple victimization raises a number of further methodological
problems for those interested in carrying out victimization surveys.9 In
addition, some important substantive reasons remain for studying multi-
ple victims. As I have already suggested, they may illuminate more gen-
eral causal processes, and thus help to show how far, and in what ways,
the attributes or behavior of victims themselves may help to explain
their victimization. Also, even if multiple victimization were merely the
8 A. REISS, VICTIM PRONENESS BY TYPE OF CRIME IN REPEAT VICTIMIZATION: ANA-
LYTICAL STUDIES IN VICTIMIZATION BY CRIME (1977) (Data Rpt. No. 7).
9 In particular, although multiple victims are a minority of all victims, they account for a
disproportionate amount of all incidents captured by most surveys. Thus they provide a
disproportionate amount of information about incidents in general. See R. SPARKS, STUDY-




result of chance (or "bad luck"), and if the number of multiple victims
were no greater than one might expect from a Poisson or other random
process, nonetheless those victims would constitute an extremely impor-
tant group. Clearly, the consequences of one-time victimization gener-
ally are not relatively serious. Such incidents (even occurring in a fairly
short time period) are relatively unimportant from the victim's point of
view and the standpoint of public policy. 1° But those whose lives are
frequently or chronically affected by crime are another matter. For
many such persons, the social meaning of crime and victimization likely
is very different from what it is to one-time victims.1 1 Thus, multiple
victims would be an important group to study even if they haven't al-
ways been as frequent as they now appear to be. Also, of course it would
not follow that their excessive victimization is in fact due to chance
(whatever that might mean), even if it were no more frequent than the
Poisson distribution would predict.
MODIFICATIONS OF THE POISSON MODEL 12
Assuming that the observed distribution of victimization with its
excess of multiple victims is real and not artificial, how might that distri-
bution be explained? Such frequency distributions can be reasonably
well reproduced by a number of simple probabilistic models resting on
assumptions different from those which govern the simple Poisson proc-
ess. One of these, attributed primarily to Polya, abandons the assump-
tion that events are statistically independent. Instead, in the present
context, being a victim on one occasion supposedly increases one's future
probability of victimization. Models of this kind have been extensively
treated by Coleman 13 among others. Coleman describes them as "con-
tagious Poisson" models, though as Greenberg' 4 has pointed out, "rein-
forcement" might in many contexts be a more appropriate term.'5 In
criminology, something of the kind was posited by some "labeling" theo-
10 See Lejeune & Alex, On Being Mugged." The Event and Its Aftermath, 2 J. URB. LIFE &
CULTURE 259 (1973).
11 For more evidence bearing on this, see PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 198-217.
12 Portions of this section and the following one are adapted from R. SPARKS, supra note
9.
13 J. COLEMAN, supra note 4.
14 D. GREENBERG, MATHEMATICAL CRIMINOLOGY 269 (1969).
15 In most applications of such models, it is assumed that the occurrence of one event
increases the rate parameter for the entire group. In the case of victimization, this assumes
that the rate parameter for each individual in the group increases, regardless of his previous
experience. This assumption can be avoided in more complex models, however. For some
discussion, see S. FEINBERG, VICTIMIZATION AND THE NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY:
PROBLEMS OF DESIGN AND ANALYSIS (1977) (Technical Rpt. No. 291, Univ. of Minnesota);
Singer & Spilerman, Social Mobility Models of Heterogeneous Populations, in SOCIOLOGICAL
METHODOLOGY 356 (H. Costmer ed. 1973).
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rists, who hypothesized that the more often an offender is arrested, con-
victed, or otherwise stigmatized as "deviant," the more likely he is to
continue offending in the future. 16 In some social situations such models
may be intuitively reasonable, but criminal victimization does not seem
to be one of them. For example, perhaps a burglar breaks into a house
or store and finds many things worth stealing and few precautions
against theft. He tells other burglars about this or plans to go back him-
self, thus increasing the probability of second and subsequent burglaries.
Perhaps a man who has been assaulted may become paranoid and bel-
ligerent, take lessons in self-defense and so on, thereby increasing his
probability of being assaulted in the future. These examples are pretty
far-fetched, and not many more suggest themselves. In particular, con-
cepts like contagion or reinforcement are not easily applied to repeated
or frequent victimization of different types, e.g., burglary followed by
robbery followed by car theft.
A more plausible modification of the Poisson process was first dis-
cussed by Greenwood and Yule in 1920.17 This relaxes the assumption
that the entire population can be characterized by the same transition
rate. Instead it assumes that the population consists of persons or other
units, such as organizations, having different degrees of "proneness" or
susceptibility to the phenomenon in question. It also assumes that
proneness-related events, such as accidents or criminal victimizations,
occur independently and randomly, so that for each subgroup, given its
average proneness, some variation or clustering would still occur around
that average. Thus even in subgroups of very low proneness, some ex-
treme multiple incidents would still occur purely by chance. Green-
wood and Yule hypothesized that the proneness they studied in
connection with data on accidents in factories was distributed according
to a two-parameter (Pearson type III) distribution,18 and that the actual
occurrence of incidents was governed by a set of Poisson processes with
different pronenesses as transition rates. The Greenwood-Yule model
can be shown to fit observed distributions of criminal victimization from
16 See, e.g., R. CARR-HILL, THE VIOLENT OFFENDER: ILLUSION OR REALITY (1971);
Green & Martin, Abscondizg from Approved Schools as Learned Behavior. A Statistical Study, 10 J.
RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 73 (1973) (applying a similar model to absconding from
juvenile institutions).
17 Greenwood & Yule, An Inquig, into the Nature of Frequency Distributions Representative of
Multiple Happenings with Particular Reference to the Occurrence ofMultiple Attacks of Disease or Re-
peated Injuries, 83 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC'Y 255 (1920).
18 But, as they remarked, "The choice of skew curves is arbitrary." Greenwood and Yule
also derive expected values on the assumption that the underlying proneness is normally dis-




several surveys in different countries quite well. 19
Quite apart from considerations of goodness of fit, the Greenwood-
Yule model, based as it is on heterogeneity or differing degrees of risk or
proneness in the population, has a certain intuitive plausibility in ex-
plaining such things as accidents or illnesses. In such a model, differ-
ences in susceptibility or proneness are conceived of as relatively
invariant in the sense that they are unaffected by the number of times a
person has previously suffered the occurrence in question. Thus, in the
case of accidents, presumptively some persons are just naturally clumsy
or are given to taking imprudent risks, while others are naturally adept
or cautious. These two groups' different experiences are conceived of as
being caused by their basic attributes, subject to a residual chance varia-
tion which behaves in accordance with a Poisson process. Though an
obvious oversimplification, it is a reasonable first step toward the expla-
nation of observed facts.
The notion of proneness needs careful interpretation, however, and
may be extremely misleading where criminal victimization is concerned.
The term is harmless enough, if it is understood to refer merely to varia-
tions in the probability of experiencing a certain event in a given time
period. But there is a danger that it may be understood to imply some-
thing more, namely, that such variations in risk are caused by inherent
attributes of persons, such as clumsiness. This is certainly not the case.
While variations in risk maybe associated with particular groups or cat-
egories of persons, the causes of those variations may lie in the social
situations of those persons, or places to which they usually go, rather
than in anything inherent in the persons themselves. With that caveat,
the term "proneness" will be used in this article, not merely to honor
established usage, but because there is no equally convenient alternative
term.
Unfortunately, models based on the notion of contagion, heteroge-
neity, or differing pronenesses have limiting distributions, which are
identical.20 Choosing between them is not possible on the basis of cross-
sectional data alone. The NCS national household data, ideally based
as they are on seven-wave panels, could in principle be used to see if the
probability of subsequent victimization increased, given past victimiza-
tion (as "contagious" models predict). Again, however, those models are
not in general reasonable. If they did turn out to be supported by the
NCS data, the findings would still warrant methodological doubts.
An explanation of multiple victimization based on heterogeneity
19 See, e.g., K. AROMAA, supra note 2; PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 92; P. WOLF, supra
note 2; Aromaa, supra note 2, 2 INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY at 333.




still needs some further modification, for models of the Greenwood-Yule
type typically have assumed that individuals' pronenesses tended to re-
main relatively fixed. This assumption is not necessary and in the case
of criminal victimization it is plainly unreasonable. On the contrary,
individual risk of victimization, though perhaps relatively durable, is
nonetheless a function of personal and social characteristics, and so can
be altered if those characteristics are changed.
Analytically, the situation is somewhat similar to one recently dis-
cussed by Eaton and Fortin2' in relation to schizophrenia. Diagnosed
schizophrenics from time to time experience acute episodes in which
they may become deluded, hallucinated, and generally out of touch
with reality. Between such acute episodes they may function more or
less normally. Some chronic schizophrenics also go through periods of
mildly impaired functioning. During these spells, the probability of ex-
periencing an acute episode is much higher. Eaton and Fortin found
that the frequency distribution of acute episodes experienced by a sam-
ple of schizophrenic patients resembled the skewed distribution of re-
ported incidents found in most victimization surveys. They also found
that a more accurate prediction of those episodes could be made if they
knew the number of subjects who, in the time period in question, had a
given number of spells in which the probability of an episode was high.
The expected distribution predicted by their assumptions turned out to
be a negative binomial, the same as that predicted by Greenwood and
Yule's heterogenous Poisson model.
The fruitfulness of the Eaton-Fortin study is that, unlike the origi-
nal Greenwood-Yule study, it allows for variations in proneness, while
still making it possible to predict, from a fairly simple set of assump-
tions, a distribution of incidents very like that which is in fact observed
in many victimization surveys. One further refinement is necessary,
however. Eaton and Fortin, like many other researchers working on
analogous problems, operationally defined their schizophrenic subjects
as being either "in a state" or "not in a state." They recognized no
intermediate status. By analogy this suggests that persons either did or
did not have a given degree of risk of victimization. This may be a
necessary first approximation, but it is an obvious oversimplification.
Furthermore such an assumption is not necessary in order to apply a
reasonably straightforward probability model of this kind. On the con-
trary, we may assume that (1) there are different degrees of proneness in
the population, and that (2) an individual's proneness or risk of victimi-
zation may vary, for example, according to variations in his lifestyle or
21 Eaton & Fortin, A Third Interpretation for the Generating Process of the Negative Binomial, 43
AM. Soc. REV. 264 (1978).
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personal characteristics. Thus, a fairly simple and realistic model rest-
ing on the assumption of variation in risk, changes in individuals'
probabilities of risk, and chance variation given a certain probability of
risk, can describe and begin to explain multiple victimization. Any real-
istic account of the observed distribution of victimization must recog-
nize that to the victim it is at least in part a matter of chance. Some
high-proneness groups or persons may be nonvictims in a particular
time period, while some low-proneness groups or persons may still be
multiple victims.
The Greenwood-Yule and Eaton-Fortin studies assumed that
proneness or its analogues were distributed in the population according
to a particular probability model, the negative binomial. That, too, is a
convenient first approximation, but it is also only a first step in trying to
estimate those variations empirically. Which groups of people, activities,
circumstances, social situations, times of day, week or year, regions of
the country, or whatever, display higher-than-average (or lower-than-
average) rates or risks of victimization? In other words, the next step in
this kind of analysis involves trying to identify concomitants or perhaps
even causes of variation in proneness or the risk of victimization. In the
survey which my colleagues and I carried out in London some years ago,
we attempted to do this empirically, following a method originally sug-
gested by Coleman.2 2 Briefly, we split our sample according to various
attributes or combinations of attributes, such as age, race, sex, expressed
attitudes, and area of residence, in an effort to find sets of subgroups
where (1) sample mean rates of victimization were significantly differ-
ent, and (2) subgroup mean rates and variances were approximately
equal. The latter is a necessary, though not of course sufficient, condi-
tion for the observed subgroup distributions to be representative of sim-
ple Poisson processes.
This attempt was unsuccessful because no matter how the sample
was sliced, at least one identified subgroup varied in victimization more
than random processes could account for. Moreover, no reasonable ex-
planation for those subgroups was readily apparent.23 That we should
have expected such an empirical method might succeed in separating
subgroups with different pronenesses may surprise some. Why should
this be possible, purely on the basis of simple combinations of demo-
graphic attributes, expressed attitudes, and so on? The criticism has
some force. Still few other attempts have been made to examine varia-
tion in victimization rates in this way. Where large samples are avail-
22 J. COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 379.
23 See K. AROMAA, supra note 2 (utilizing the same approach with Finnish data, with no
more success); PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 83.
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able (as is the case with the National Crime Survey city-level and
national household panel data sets), patterns and variations in mean
rates of victimization can be estimated far more precisely than was pos-
sible for either the London or the Finnish samples. Unfortunately, there
are not enough independent variables in the NCS data to permit a de-
tailed examination of this matter.2 4 However, there are more data, such
as control-card data, than have yet been examined from this point of
view. The next section of this article will list some concepts to help
guide such an examination and permit us to begin assessing the determi-
nants of variation in proneness to victimization.
Before that, however, two further modifications of Poisson-type
processes that may apply to criminal victimization should be discussed.
Under certain circumstances these modifications may help to explain
the observed distribution of multiple victims. First, for some proportion
of the population, the probability of becoming a victim of crime within
any given time period is effectively zero because they take special pre-
cautions against crime, or for some other reason. Assume this group is
"immune" to victimization. Assume further that victimization in the
rest of the population is distributed according to a simple Poisson proc-
ess, or a Greenwood-Yule heterogeneous one. In order to fit such a
model it is necessary to make some assumption either about the size of
the immune group, or about the transition rates for the non-immune
cases. Good data that would permit either estimate are not now avail-
able.25
A second, related possibility is that the population is composed of a
number of subgroups with different Poisson transition rates, but that for
some of those subgroups those rates are decreasing over time as a result
of prior victimizations. In other words for some members of the popula-
tion, the experience of victimization leads them to modify their behavior
and take precautions against future victimization so that with each suc-
cessive victimization, their probability of being a victim in the future
decreases until they are immune. Attempting to identify such groups,
and to estimate not only their basic pronenesses but the successive decre-
ments to those pronenesses given past victimization, is currently impossi-
ble. The general concept of a reduction of subgroup proneness as a
result of actions taken in consequence of prior victimization, however, is
as important as the concept of immunity discussed above.
24 See COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL STATISTICS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, "SUR-
VEYING CRIME"--FINAL REPORT OF THE PANEL FOR EVALUATION OF CRIME SURVEYS (B.
Penick & M. Owens eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as SURVEYING CRIME].
25 See PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 94-95.
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SOME THEORY ABOUT MULTIPLE VICTIMIZATION
If the general notions of heterogeneity, immunity, and so forth, are
accepted as reasonable, the task of explaining the existence and distribu-
tion of multiple victimization will be simplified, though not accom-
plished. Why do people possess certain degrees of proneness at
particular times? Invoking the gamma distribution does not provide a
very satisfactory answer to this question.
Evidently the answer is in attributes of people themselves-their
social, psychological, economic, cultural, and spatio-temporal proper-
ties. Two accounts of the connections between those properties, and
proneness to victimization, have recently appeared. The Panel for the
Evaluation of Crime Surveys26 conceived of those connections in terms
of "vulnerability" and "risk." More recently, Hindelang, Gottfredson,
and Garofalo 27 have proposed a theoretical model based on lifestyle,
which they hypothesize to affect victimization primarily (though by no
means entirely) through variation in exposure to risk. The matter is
somewhat more complex than either makes it seem.28 There are at least
six ways in which the actions, attributes, or social situations of victims
may help to explain variations in victimization rates.
PRECIPITATION
As Wolfgang 29 pointed out, a victim may act in such a way as to
precipitate or encourage the offender's behavior. Typically, but not nec-
essarily, the victim's words or actions arouse the offender's emotions, and
the offender acts under the influence of those emotions. As the courts
have long recognized, such actions may be less than fully "voluntary."
Significantly, the concept of precipitation sketched here marks a causal
distinction, and not just a legal or moral one, though the two are re-
lated. A victim who precipitates an offender's action does or says some-
thing that works on the emotions or passions of the offender to such an
extent that he makes the offender act as he does. This kind of causation
may be extremely rare, but possible. Compare making someone jump by
suddenly shouting "Boo!" at them from behind, andgetting them to jump
by saying "I'll give you $100 if you jump."
FACILITATION
Even if the victim does not take any active part in the crime, he
26 SURVEYING CRIME, supra note 24, at 92-99.
27 PERSONAL CRIME, supra note 2, at 250-72.
28 For an earlier and even more oversimplified account, set PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at
97-106.
29 M. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE (1958).
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may facilitate its commission-by deliberately, recklessly, or negligently
placing himself at special risk. The group of "temptation-opportunity"
situations identified by Normandeau 30 belongs in this category. Thus,
persons who leave property in unlocked cars may substantially increase
the risk of that property being stolen; persons who cash checks without
asking for identification may increase the risk of accepting bogus checks;
persons who sign contracts without reading the fine print run the risk of
fraud by bogus repairmen. In general, anyone who fails to take reason-
able precautions against crime may be said to have facilitated a crime
against him. In other words, facilitation involves the creation of special
risks; and (unlike precipitation) it need not involve a bilateral transac-
tion with the offender. Facilitation, thus defined, is both context-depen-
dent and culture-dependent. While it may be reasonable to leave your
house unlocked in a low-crime, rural area, in certain inner-city areas it
might be tantamount to inviting theft. Facilitation thus must be seen
against the background of standards generally accepted in both the
group and the situation in question. Such standards may of course be
very vague; but that is not an argument against the concept of facilita-
tion.
VULNERABILITY
Some persons, because of their attributes, usual behavior, or their
place in a social system, may be very vulnerable to crime, in that they
are abnormally susceptible to it. This implies that they are less than
normally capable of preventing such crimes against themselves. Several
of the general categories of victims mentioned by von Hentig3' were
thought by him to be clearly vulnerable in this sense. Thus, the very
young and the elderly are physically less able to resist violent attack, as
are some adult females. The mentally defective, immigrants, and the
uneducated or inexperienced are especially vulnerable to deception and
fraud.
Note that this is vulnerability in a different sense than that used by
the National Academy Panel in its recent report.32 The Panel distin-
guished between what it called ecological vulnerability (e.g., living in a
high-crime area); status vulnerability arising from such attributes as sex,
race, occupation, or social class; and role vulnerability, arising from rela-
tionships from which the individual cannot readily withdraw (e.g., mar-
riage, tenancy). This use of the concept is too broad. It fails to specify
how particular roles, statuses, or environments lead to higher risk of vic-
30 A. Normandeau, Trends and Patterns in Crimes of Robbery (1968) (unpublished dis-
sertation at University of Pennsylvania Library).
31 H. VON HENTIG, THE CRIMINAL AND His VICTIM (1948).
32 SURVEYING CRIME, sufra note 24, at 94-97.
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timization. Indeed, the Panel's use of the term vulnerability seems at
times equivalent to the notion of proneness. Marriage would not cause
vulnerability as defined in this article unless the spouse had a high pro-
pensity to commit crime against his partner. Other instances of such
vulnerability would include physical frailty, visible intoxication, or
blindness. These may normally carry a higher risk of victimization be-
cause they deprive individuals of the normal ability to prevent crimes
against themselves. What distinguishes vulnerability from facilitation,
as defined above, is that vulnerability does not involve any deviation
from standards of due care; the victim or potential victim who is vulner-
able need do nothing to create a greater risk than that possessed by those
who share his attributes. 33
OPPORTUNITY
Opportunity is of course a logically necessary condition for crime.
In order to be a victim of car theft, it is necessary to have a car; and a
man who never goes out of his house will never be robbed in the street. 34
Earlier I defined facilitation as the creation of a special risk, for exam-
ple, cashing checks without requiring identification. But an opportunity
variable-in this case, the practice of using checks-is required before
such frauds can be facilitated or committed. Similarly, there is a dis-
tinction between conditions creating opportunity, and conditions creat-
ing vulnerability: a person living in an unprotected house in a
neighborhood full of thieves may be vulnerable to theft, but there will
be no opportunity for theft if he has nothing to steal.
The central propositions of the theory of personal victimization ad-
vanced by Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo 35 are apparently pro-
positions about opportunity. Thus, their Proposition 1 asserts that the
probability of suffering a personal victimization is directly (1e., posi-
tively) related to the amount of time that a person spends in public
places, especially at night; this amount of time is said in turn (Proposi-
tion 2) to depend on "lifestyle." Surely that is just a generalization of a
set of statements to the effect that a man who never goes out of his house
will never get robbed in the street?
Similarly, their Proposition 6 asserts that the probability of per-
33 Of course the victim or potential victim may have done something at some earlier time
that leads to his subsequent vulnerability. For example, he may have married an alcoholic
with a history of violence when drunk. This would scarcely be regarded as facilitation in the
sense this article uses, unless the person knew of the spouse's violent propensities, or perhaps
voluntarily stayed within the marital home after the violence manifested itself.
34 For a further discussion, see Sparks, Criminal Opportunities and Crime Rates, in INDICA-
TORS OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: QUANTITATIVE METHODS, (S. Feinberg & A.
Reiss eds. 1981).
35 PERSONAL CRIME, supra note 2, at 250-66.
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sonal victimization, particularly theft, is directly related to the amount
of time that an individual spends among non-family members-the as-
sumption being, presumably, that family members do not often steal
from one another. This too relates to opportunity-some sorts of per-
sonal theft require propinquity-though we should note that a person
who wasforced (e.g., because of his employment) to spend a dispropor-
tionate amount of time in public places might on that account be said to
be vulnerable to personal theft (in my sense of that term, which is approx-
imately equivalent to Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo's term
"vincible." This shows the borderline between my two concepts, though
it does not, I think, show that they overlap.)
ATTRACTIVENESS
Plainly some targets are more attractive than others from a crimi-
nal's point of view. Thus, persons who look affluent are better prospects
for robbery than persons who look impoverished; expensive houses full
of durable consumer goods are more attractive to a burglar than tene-
ments in a slum. Presumably extreme ugliness, old age, and halitosis are
disincentives to certain sorts of sexual assault. Attractiveness is, of
course, in the eye of the beholder. The victim may make every attempt
to hide his or her attractiveness to no avail. Attractiveness may be hid-
den, but it will not immunize a victim. Thus, rich women may remove
their jewelry when traveling to and from parties but that does not re-
move the opportunity for robbery. Similarly, political bagmen, narcot-
ics dealers, and those too poor to have bank accounts are typically
forced to deal in cash. They do not intentionally or negligently bring
about their attractiveness to robbers; they are simply stuck with it.
Moreover, some varieties of attractiveness cannot logically be concealed.
How do you make a Lamborghini less attractive to a potential car thief
without making it look less like a Lamborghini? All you can do is make
it look like a less attractive Lamborghini, for example, by letting it get
very dirty or painting it a hideous shade of chartreuse.
IMPUNITY
Finally, certain persons have higher-than-average proneness to vic-
timization, not because their attributes or actions are conducive to crime
or make it specially tempting, but because they make it easy to get away
with. This category does not include a failure to protect person or prop-
erty through deadbolt locks, cans of mace, or the like. Some persons are
selected as victims precisely because they are believed to have limited
access to the usual machinery of social control. Thus, homosexuals are
said to be frequent victims of blackmail and extortion because they are
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thought to be reluctant to notify the police. Similarly, criminals, ex-
criminals, neighborhood paranoiacs, and members of minority groups
may be chosen as victims because they are thought to be unable or un-
willing to call the police.
Here, then, are six ways in which some .persons may have higher
proneness to criminal victimization than others. There may well be
other ways in which victims of crime play an important part in causing
their own victimization, though these six are likely to be quantitatively
the most important. Analytically distinct, they are not mutually exclu-
sive, and there may well be correlations and interactions between them
for particular kinds of persons or crime. Furthermore, the six concepts
may relate to particular places or social situations as well as to persons.
Thus, dark alleys, basements, elevators in public housing developments,
and late-night subway trains may make persons vulnerable; schoolyards,
bars, and sports arenas may lead to precipitation; prisons, railway sta-
tions, and crowded department stores may facilitate crime to the extent
that they make it difficult or impossible for people to take reasonable
precautions against it; brothels, illegal gambling dens, and narcotics
transactions may offer high impunity to would-be offenders.
Proneness is a function of the six concepts just listed. Those con-
cepts in turn depend on the social and personal characteristics of differ-
ent groups in the population, their lifestyles. A change in a person's
attributes or usual behavior would thus alter the extent to which he
facilitated, attracted, was vulnerable, etc., to crime, and would thus al-
ter his proneness to that type of crime. Following the argument in the
preceding section of this paper, the probability that a person would ac-
tually be victimized is a function of his proneness as well as a random
element not dependent on the attributes or social situation of the victim.
Given sufficient information about the attributes and behavior of a pop-
ulation, calculation of their "net proneness" to criminal victimization
would in principle be possible, ie., the probability of victimization in a
given time period t. That would permit us to calculate an expected
level of victimization around which there should merely be random
stochastic variation. Then, if the relevant characteristics of the popula-
tion were to change (e.g., people go out less often, barricade themselves
behind dozens of locks, get divorced, give away all their money, quit
dealing cocaine), their proneness, and thus the expected rate of victimi-
zation in the population, should decrease accordingly.
The operational definition of these six concepts, and their applica-
tion to fact situations to make concrete predictions, may of course be
difficult in some cases. On balance, however, it will usually be no more
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difficult than operational definition anywhere else in social research.3 6
However, two issues may be problematic in doing this kind of research
in the special context of multiple victimization, where the process may
be more easily seen. These issues are discussed briefly in the next sec-
tion.
FUTURE RESEARCH ON MULTIPLE VICTIMS
An important contribution of the research done in the name of vic-
timology is that it has not, by and large, relied on large-scale social
surveys as a research technique. Such surveys will continue to be an
important source of information about victimization in general and
multiple victimization in particular, but they have distinct limitations,
especially where multiple victimization is concerned. The first of these
relates to sampling, the second to data collection.
Victimization is a relatively rare event in the American population,
and multiple victimization is even rarer. Representative samples of the
general population are thus unlikely to produce sufficient cases of multi-
ple victimization for study, except at inordinate cost. Conventional vic-
timization surveys are of course possible in high-crime areas where the
proportion of victims and multiple victims can reasonably be expected
to be high. Alternatively, and perhaps preferably in the present state of
our knowledge, samples could be drawn from persons whose victimiza-
tion has on some occasion come to the attention of the police or other
social agencies, such as hospitals.
However such cases may be identified, effective research on multi-
ple victimization will require detailed information on the social and per-
sonal contexts in which the victimization took place. This almost
certainly cannot be obtained, at present, using interviewing techniques
appropriate to general-population surveys like the NOS. However,
eventually sufficient indicators of the determinants of proneness may ec-
onomically be obtained in relatively short, structured half-hour inter-
views. For the present, more detailed interviewing of the kind used in a
very different context by Toch3 7 is needed. Such interviews would seek
to embed victimizations in the life-situations of the victims, by trying to
answer questions like the following: Did the victimizations occur be-
cause the victim in some way facilitated them? Were they related to a
vulnerability arising in turn out of a role-relationship that persisted over
time? Did victimizations cease after the victim took steps to reduce the
opportunity for victimization, and if so, what were those steps? Was
there an element of precipitation, at least so far as can be judged by
36 Id.; R. SPARKS, supra note 9.
37 H. TOCH, MEN IN CRISIS (1975); H. TocH, VIOLENT MEN (1969).
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accounts given by victims, in respect of personal crimes? Was the victim
limited in his or her access to law enforcement or social control, or was it
probably believed that this was so? Did the victim's behavior make him
an especially attractive target? To what extent were those persons who
might attract crime also able to take steps to limit the opportunity for it,
or, conversely, to what extent did they facilitate it by failing to take
precautions? If so, what was the result?
The outcome variable, criminal victimization, may take various
forms. This itself is a matter in need of much further detailed investiga-
tion. How many of those whom we call multiple victims are victims of
different types of crime so that pronenesses are correlated? What are the
typical time intervals between victimizations, for high-proneness
groups? To what extent are the incidents now called series victimiza-
tions in the NCS and other victimization surveys incidents involving the
same offender or group of offenders, such as a landlord, or a particular
group of vandalizing neighborhood children? To what extent are some
cases of multiple victimization best understood, not as discrete incidents,
but as continuing states or conditions? Perhaps a housewife reports fre-
quent beatings by her spouse, but the more important element is not this
or that blow on the head, but the continuing state of terror and shame
she must endure. After one or more incidents of victimization, to what
extent do people take steps to reduce their proneness to that type of
crime? To what extent can they do so? Why are some people who live
in high-crime areas not victims, if indeed this is the case? Do victims
who have been dissatisfied with the police response fail to call the police
in the future, thus increasing the impunity with which offenders can
victimize them again?
This is but a small sample of the questions to which we now need
answers. One hypothesis, of course, is that the answers to those ques-
tions will be the same for multiple victims, as for one-time victims.
Whether or not this is so, we need to begin to try to see criminal victimi-
zation in its social and personal context, and to relate incidents involv-
ing crime to the rest of the victims' lives and life-situations, so far as this
can be done. Of course there may always be some persons for whom
victimization, including multiple victimization, is a matter of chance,
absolutely unrelated to their attributes or behavior. That, too, is a hy-
pothesis, to be investigated in the same way as the others listed in this
article.
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